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Goldman Sachs Group Inc (GS) - Stock Report

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Vollständiger Haftungsausschluss
GS

Goldman Sachs Group Inc

ReasyPort View: Too Demanding — ROTE And Marks Proof Required

Summary

The Goldman Sachs Group traded at $1,090.67 at the 16 June 2026 close, against the selected bank selected fair value of $506.82 per share. That puts the market price about 115% above the selected fair value and well beyond the $675.76 upside marker, so the stock is above the entire underwritten valuation range. This is a valuation-discipline conclusion, not a rejection of the franchise: Goldman remains one of the strongest global capital-markets platforms, but the current price requires a more durable return-on-tangible-equity base and cleaner fair-value risk profile than this framework underwrites today.

Latest Proof Snapshot

The latest proof is strong but not a clean normalized run rate for a stock priced at about 3.0x Q1 period-end book value, a balance-sheet reference for the quarter. In Q1 2026, Goldman reported $17.23 billion of net revenues, reported diluted EPS of $17.55 versus $14.12 a year earlier, and single-quarter annualized reported ROE of 19.8%; the release centers on reported EPS rather than an adjusted EPS bridge, so the Q1 2026 tax benefit from employee share-based awards that added $2.91 to diluted EPS is a normalization item. Global Banking & Markets produced $12.74 billion of net revenues, with Equities up 27% and investment banking fees up 48%, while FICC fell 10%; its Other revenue rose to $561 million from $200 million, primarily reflecting significantly higher net gains from direct investments. The roughly $361 million year-over-year GBM Other lift is primarily mark-sensitive support to reported EPS that should not be annualized, separate from client-flow and fee economics; together with the tax benefit, it means normalized earning power should not simply annualize Q1. CET1 declined to 12.5% under Standardized rules from 14.3% at year-end 2025, and Q1 capital returns for the quarter of $6.38 billion included $5.00 billion of repurchases at an average $923.49.

The key macro issue is not capital-markets exposure in isolation, but whether stronger underwriting, M&A and trading activity converts into durable ROTE and book-value growth after marks, taxes, compensation and CET1 needs; if it does, Goldman can justify more of the premium, but if activity normalizes the same franchise can look expensive despite being better run.

Business Overview

What The Company Actually Does

Goldman Sachs is a global investment bank, market maker, asset manager, wealth adviser and bank holding company. Its clients are corporations seeking advice or capital, investors needing execution and financing, institutional allocators putting capital to work in markets, and wealth clients using advice, deposits and loans. The business earns through advisory and underwriting fees, bid/offer spreads, financing balances, management fees, incentive fees, lending spread, and principal-investment gains or losses.

How The Business Is Organized

The current reporting structure has three segments. Global Banking & Markets is the core value engine: advisory, underwriting, FICC, equities, prime financing, transaction banking and related lending sit here. Asset & Wealth Management is the durability bridge: management fees, wealth advice, private banking and alternative assets can soften trading cyclicality if they grow without tying up too much balance sheet. Platform Solutions is now mainly an exit problem around Apple Card and legacy consumer activities; its economic role is risk removal.

What Management Appears To Be Prioritizing

Management is trying to turn Goldman back toward institutional and wealth-management strengths after the consumer-banking experiment reduced credibility. The January 2026 Industry Ventures acquisition and April 2026 Innovator Capital Management closing support the alternatives and ETF-management strategy, but the valuation test is whether the fee platform can lift through-cycle ROTE while liquidity, capital ratios and principal-investment exits remain controlled.

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